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Abstract
Chang, Lai and Chang (1999) use a micro-founded short-term macroeconomic model, with
an imperfectly competitive market, to analyze, among other issues, the relationship between
tax evasion and tax revenue. They show that this relationship depends upon the market
structure. In particular, when the market becomes perfectly competitive, this relationship can
be non monotonic. Although CLC give an intuition of this result, based on the interaction of
two opposite effects, they do not make explicit the form of this relationship. The goal of this
note is precisely to show that, within the Chang, Lai and Chang (1999) model, one can
completely characterize the shape of the relationship between tax evasion and tax revenue
under perfect competition. Under some parametric conditions, the tax revenue decreases with
tax evasion; otherwise, their relationship takes the form of a `Laffer curve'.
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The macroeconomic consequences of tax evasion (in particular, the tax revenue loss) is an
important issue1 that has received relatively little attention in the theoretical literature (see
CaballØ and PanadØs 2000). In a simple Keynesian model, Peacock and Shaw (1982) were
the ￿rst to show that, provided the marginal net propensity to spend is less than unity, tax
evasion decreases the tax revenue. In a more general framework, Ricketts (1984) con￿rms
the negative e⁄ect of tax evasion upon the tax revenue. But later, Lai and Chang (1988),
Von Zameck (1989), Lai, Chang and Chang (1995) and Chang and Lai (1996) show that
tax evasion may even lead to an increase in the tax revenue. The drawback with all these
articles is their lack of microeconomic foundations.
In order to correct this, Chang, Lai and Chang (1999) [hereinafter CLC] use a micro-
founded short-term macroeconomic model, with an imperfectly competitive market, to ana-
lyze, among other issues, the relationship between tax evasion and tax revenue. They show
that this relationship depends upon the market structure. When the market tends to be
monopolistic, an increase in tax evasion decreases the tax revenue, as in Peacock and Shaw
(1982) and Ricketts (1984). But, when the market becomes perfectly competitive, this rela-
tionship can be non monotonic. Although CLC give an intuition of this result, based on the
interaction of two opposite e⁄ects, they do not make explicit the form of this relationship.
The goal of this note is precisely to show that, within the CLC model, one can completely
characterize the shape of the relationship between tax evasion and tax revenue under perfect
competition. Under some parametric conditions, the tax revenue decreases with tax evasion;
otherwise, their relationship takes the form of a ￿ La⁄er curve￿ .
2. The CLC model
We brie￿ y present the CLC model and we explain the notations, when needed. The
model, build-up on Dixon (1987) and Mankiw (1988), consists of a representative consumer,
a number of identical ￿rms and the government.
The representative consumer is price taker, has initial money balances and time en-
dowment V and, owns all ￿rms. After receiving his revenues from labour and pro￿ts, the
consumer has to pay an income tax, at a rate of t 2 (0;1).2 CLC denote by h 2 [0;1] the
(exogenous) fraction of the tax that is e⁄ectively remitted to the government. The con-
sumer￿ s demands for goods, real money and leisure are derived from the maximization of his
Cobb-Douglas utility function, subject to his budget constraint.
Firms only use labor to produce output, with a constant returns to scale technology.
They are price takers in the labor market. But, in the product market, ￿rms compete ￿ la
Cournot. CLC use the ￿rms￿pro￿t margin ￿ as an index of the degree of competition in the
product market.
The government spends its revenues from income taxation T in two ways: real expendi-
tures G and a lump-sum transfer to the consumer.
1In the USA, the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) estimates a tax gap for the tax year 2001 of U$D 345
billion, an amount that represents almost 15% of the total tax revenue (see IRS 2006).
2Although CLC do not mention boundary restrictions on t; they undertake the analysis assuming them
implicitly. In fact, when t = 0 or t = 1; the model may have no solution.
1From the expression of the individual demands, the government￿ s budget constraint and
the markets￿equilibrium conditions, CLC obtain the values of the aggregate output Y and
the price level.
3. The relationship between tax evasion and tax revenue
CLC study the relationship between tax evasion and tax revenue doing a comparative
static analysis with respect to the compliance parameter h. First, they ￿nd the equilibrium
amount of the tax revenue
T = thY = th
￿(1 ￿ ht)(1 ￿ ￿)V + ￿G
￿(1 ￿ ht)(1 ￿ ￿) + ￿
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As CLC state, an increase in the compliance parameter h (i.e. a decrease in tax evasion)
has two opposite e⁄ects upon the tax revenue. The ￿ compliance e⁄ect￿is direct and positive.
The ￿ income e⁄ect￿is indirect and negative because, as Peacock and Shaw (1982) show and
CLC con￿rm, aggregate output decreases with compliance.
The sign of (2) depends upon the degree of competition in the product market. In
particular, when the market is perfectly competitive (i.e. when ￿ = 0), (1) and (2) become
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As CLC state, the derivative in (3) has an ambiguous sign because, under perfect competi-
tion, both abovementioned e⁄ects are present.4 But CLC do not go beyond this statement.
In the following proposition, we complete their analysis by characterizing the form of the
relationship between tax evasion and tax revenue.
Proposition In Chang, Lai and Chang (1999), when the product market is perfectly com-
petitive, the relationship between tax evasion and tax revenue can adopt only two forms.
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; this relationship is non
3As the utility function is Cobb-Douglas, these parameters represent, at the consumer￿ s optimum, the
fraction of his real income spent in goods and leisure, respectively.
4This is not the case when the market tends to be monopolistic (i.e. when ￿ ! 1). Under this circum-
stance, the income e⁄ect is absent.
2monotonic and takes the form of a ￿ La⁄er curve￿ . Otherwise, this relationship is monotonic
decreasing.
Proof. See the Appendix.
Under some parametric con￿gurations on ￿;￿;G;V and t, the compliance e⁄ect domi-
nates, for any h 2 [0;1]: Thus, the tax revenue decreases with evasion, con￿rming again the
Peacock and Shaw￿ s (1982) result. But, under other parametric con￿gurations, this negative
relationship may not hold. For lower values of h; the compliance e⁄ect dominates while, for
higher values, it is the output e⁄ect that prevails. So the relationship between tax evasion
and tax revenue takes the form of a ￿ La⁄er curve￿ . This result completes the analysis of CLC
when the product market is perfectly competitive.
Appendix: Proof of the Proposition
First, it is straightforward to prove that T(h) and
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(h) given by (3) are continuous
functions of h 2 [0;1]: These functions verify
T(0) = 0 , T(1) = t
￿(1 ￿ t)V + ￿G


















￿V [￿(1 ￿ t)2 + ￿(1 ￿ 2t)] + ￿(￿ + ￿)G
[￿(1 ￿ t) + ￿]2
for all t 2 (0;1): The sign of the last derivative is, a priori, ambiguous. But we can obtain
it, as the following lemma shows.
Lemma When (￿ + ￿)G < ￿V
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When (￿ + ￿)G ￿ ￿V ,
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is given by the sign of its numerator. In order to
study it, let￿ s de￿ne the following quadratic function of t
F(t) = ￿t
2 ￿ 2t(￿ + ￿) + ￿ + ￿
This function veri￿es
lim
t!0 F(t) = ￿ + ￿ > 0 , lim
t!1 F(t) = ￿￿ < 0
3and
F
0 < 0 for all t 2 (0;1)
On the one hand, if (￿+￿)G ￿ ￿V; F(t) > ￿￿
(￿ + ￿)G
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Next, we study the shape of T(h) under each of these possible con￿gurations of parameters.
Case 1 (￿ + ￿)G < ￿V and ￿ < t < 1










is continuos on [0;1] and
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there exists at least a critical number b h such that
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h=b h
= 0 (Bolzano￿ s Theorem): Com-
puting the derivative of
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￿V [2￿(1 ￿ ht)t + 2￿t]
[￿(1 ￿ ht) + ￿]2 < 0 (4)
This implies that any critical value T(b h) is a local maximum. Using (4) again, we can easily
prove by contradiction that, in fact, T(h) has a unique local maximum. Therefore, in this
￿rst case, the shape of T(h) takes the form of a ￿ La⁄er curve￿ .
Case 2 Either (￿ + ￿)G ￿ ￿V or (￿ + ￿)G < ￿V and 0 < t < ￿
In these cases, as
@T
@h
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
h=1
is (weakly or strictly) positive, T(h) can be either monotonic
increasing or non monotonic. As
@T
@h
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
h=0
> 0; T(h) has to have a local minimum to be
non monotonic. But, due to (4), this is not possible. So, in these cases, T(h) is monotonic
increasing, and thus the relationship between tax evasion and tax revenue is monotonic
decreasing ￿
5The inequality holds because V > G and, by assumption, ￿ + ￿ < 1:
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